A state-independent quantum key distribution (SIQKD) protocol is proposed that utilises qubits to establish a raw key, irrespective of the qubit states. Time-like sequential measurements lead to an inequality formally identical to the Bell-CHSH inequality, which relies only on the measurements performed. It is shown that this form manifests naturally from non-commutativity of observables. The state-independence of SIQKD arises due the employment of the BTCV temporal Bell-CHSH inequality [1, 2] -constructed from time-like sequential measurements on a single qubit systemto detect eavesdropping. In the light of quantum information theory, rendering applications stateindependent eliminates the need for complex processes to prepare and manipulate quantum states. One such application is demonstrated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution is a powerful cryptographic tool in quantum information theory that relies on quantum features such as superposition and non-locality to provide a secure key technique at a distance without any assumptions made on the computational power of a potential disruptor or eavesdropper. Thus far, qubit states have been used to establish a raw key between two parties, from which a classical key is distilled through classical information reconciliation [3] . Additionally, non-locality viz. the Bell inequality [4] has been operationally employed for intuitive device-independence for certain cryptographic protocols [5, 6] .
Two seminal quantum protocols for raw key generation are the BB84 [3] and Ekert [5] methods. The BB84 protocol involves one party sending the second a string of qubits over a quantum channel, and the ensuing secure key generation relies on measurement matching. The Ekert protocol employs the Bell-CHSH inequality [7] to test for eavesdropping through the use of entangled qubit pairs that are shared between the two communicating parties. While it provides device-independent security, it relies on the entangled pairs being shared beforehand. At the heart of these protocols and variations thereof lie the generation and manipulation of quantum states.
The preparation of quantum states is in itself a vast area of study, prone to obstacles such as decoherence [8] . While the ideal experimental scenario involves the preparation of a quantum system in a pure state, the reality is that the state inevitably interacts with its environment to evolve into more of a statistical mixture of pure states, or a mixed state. In this manner, quantum information is irreversibly leaked.
While advances in quantum optics hope to curb this leakage (see [9] and citations therein), applications that are state-independent would eliminate the need for complex processes to prepare and manipulate quantum states. In this paper, one such application is provided. The state-independent quantum key distribution (SIQKD) protocol proposed here has at its core correlations that are not space-like separated, but time-like separated. To realise this, we employ the Brukner-Taylor-Cheung-Vedral (BTCV) formalism [1, 2] , which makes use of sequential projective measurements on a single system, as opposed to measurements on space-like separated coupled systems.
The BTCV formulation relies solely on the measurement operators, and one can therefore not make a comment on the non-classicality of the state. However, in some sense, one can say that all states can violate this inequality, even fully mixed ones [10] . Correlations in time can be considered manifestations of sequential measurements. They provide an operational probabilistic framework that can be applied to enhance probabilities of success in classical protocols such as computational complexity tasks, as demonstrated in [1, 2] .
In the SIQKD protocol, the BTCV formalism provides a probabilistic tool that allows two parties to detect an eavesdropper even if the initial state is completely mixed -thus rendering it truly state-independent. We begin with a brief overview of the time-like Bell-CHSH inequality in Section II with important notes on the origin of the state-independence and whether the correlations can be considered non-classical, then proceed to SIQKD in Section III.
II. BTCV TIME-LIKE BELL-CHSH INEQUALITY
We briefly discuss the time-like Bell-CHSH inequality as given in [1, 2] , further studied in [11] , and experimentally verified in [10] .
Consider an arbitrary two-level mixed state: ρ = Therefore, the correlation function between the measurements at the two times is given by:
where
. This leads to:
This correlation function is similar in form to the quantum mechanical correlation function for the spin- singlet state, as solely being dependent on the angle between a and b. Moreover, it is remarkably state-independent, that is, it is independent of the initial state ρ. Thus whether the initial qubit state was mixed or pure is irrelevant, as once the initial measurement is performed, the resulting state is that corresponding to the projector associated with the outcome.
Note that any qubit dynamics between t 1 and t 2 can be represented as well by a rotation matrix R ∈ SO(3). Prior to the second measurement, the state is R(k a) = kR( a), where k = ±1. The probability for obtaining the outcome l is 1 2 (1 + kl b · R( a)). The correlator becomes C = R( a) · b [11] .
Through classical constraints, the bound imposed on the temporal analog of the Bell-CHSH expression is:
Maximal violation occurs at 2
. Therefore, the Tsirelson bound [12] can be reached by appropriate measurements on the Bloch sphere.
A. Measurement at t 2 Where t 1 < t 2 < t 3
If three sequential measurements ( σ · a), ( σ · b), ( σ · c) were considered instead of two, at times t 1 < t 2 < t 3 , then the correlation function between t 1 and t 3 is [1, 2]:
Therefore: 1) the quantum correlation function for measurements at m instances can be considered a product of two-fold temporal correlations, and 2) measurement at t 2 disrupts correlations between measurements at t 1 and t 3 as the temporal Bell-CHSH inequality between t 1 and t 3 is no longer violated -a straightforward algebraic exercise.
B. Non-commutativity and the Time-like Bell-CHSH Inequality
For the sake of conceptual clarity, we show how the Bell-CHSH inequality derived by [1, 2] can be understood as a natural arisal from the non-commutativity of observables and not a reflection of non-classical correlations in time. Indeed, the non-classicality in this formalism can be attributed to non-commutativity and the symmetric nature of conditional probabilities in quantum physics.
Proposition: A state-independent Bell-CHSH inequality can be derived by non-commuting observables, provided the first observable, A, shares an eigen basis with the original state, ρ, that is: [A, ρ] = 0.
Proof: Consider three non-commuting dichotomic observables A, B and C, where A shares an eigen basis with state ρ = 1 2
[1+ σ· p]. Thus, the projectors of A corresponding to outcomes ±1 are:
Projectors of B and C take a similar form, defined by variables b, c respectively:
As A, B, C are non-commuting, T r[Π i± Π j± ] ≥ 0 always, where i, j = A, B, C and i = j. Hence, a reasonable conclusion is that
Without loss of generality, we consider the symmetrised product of projectors Π A+ , Π B+ , Π C+ in the form of a pseudo-projection operator as given in [13] , and omit the outcome index + for convenience:
This pseudo-projection operator is Hermitian, but not indempotent, ergo 'pseudo'. Taking the trace, one finds:
We know T r[Π ABC ] ≥ 0, that is, 1+ p·( b+ c). Taking b → − b and c → − c, and combining the two we find:
Note that Eq. 10 is the symmetric conditional probability employed in the time-like correlation function given in Eq. 1, namely:
This symmetrisation is at the heart of quantum physics, being impossible in the classical scenario, and is a feature that is exploited by the Bell-CHSH inequality.
In order to bring this to the Bell-CHSH form, we consider four orientations b 1 , b 2 , c 1 , c 2 :
C. Short Note: Non-classicality and the Temporal Correlations
That the temporal Bell-CHSH inequality of the BTCV prescription can be violated maximally is on its own not enough to suggest that the correlations are non-classical, even though the inequality arises from a non-classical construction as previously mentioned. The TonerBacon 1-bit protocol [14] , used to simulate the singlet state, can easily be implemented to simulate the temporal correlations [15] . Moreover, a sequence of T-B protocols can be implemented to mimic sequential projective measurements, as the correlations are factored into dot product pairs as shown in Eq. 4.
An assessment of non-classicality, defined by the classical simulability of a temporal correlation, is given in [15] . A temporal correlation function of an d-level physical system is said to be non-classical if every classical algorithm that simulates the function requires more than log 2 d bits of classical communication at some point during the simulation. In [15] , a lower bound is provided for the number of sequential measurements to be performed in order for the correlations to be non-classical. For a qudit, the number of measurements, n, should follow n ≥ d.
This is important to note before making a claim on the non-classicality of the correlations. However, in the SIQKD protocol proposed ahead, it is unnecessary to ensure non-classical correlations in the sense described above, as the protocol relies instead on a violation of the temporal Bell-CHSH inequality, which is an algebraic consequence of the non-classical conditional probabilities. Indeed, this sequence of measurements may be realised through classically polarised electromagnetic waves, a representation of which is shown in Figure 1 , considering the use of two half wave plates with principle axes coinciding with a 1 and b 1 respectively. The correlation function C( a 1 , b 1 ) = a 1 · b 1 relies on the angle between the two. Because this sequence of measurements leads to an inequality formally identical to the Bell-CHSH inequality, we continue to make use of this terminology. With this disclaimer, we proceed to the protocol.
III. STATE-INDEPENDENT SECURE QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
The implementation of a successful quantum key generation protocol requires two parts: 1) the quantum part, which establishes a raw key between two parties, and 2) classical post processing, in which privacy amplification and information reconciliation lead to a distillation of the final one-time pad from the raw key. These parts are often explored separately, yet if the tools required for post-processing could somehow be used in the initial quantum stage to generate the key, a level of security may be introduced. One such proposal is offered here.
In this protocol, the raw key is generated ensuring security through a state-independent method following [1, 2] , that relies on the final key that will ultimately be used as a onetime pad. The protocol involves two separate parties, Alice and Bob. It is Alice who locally randomly generates a binary string X 2 within her sealed lab, a part of which will be used to generate the final key. The crux of this protocol is conveying this string securely to Bob, without a third eavesdropping party, Eve, gaining knowledge of it.
We begin with the labelling conventions and assumptions behind this protocol.
A. Labelling Conventions
Alice performs measurements with dichotomic observables A i , which rely on parameters a i . Likewise, Bob's dichotomic observables are denoted by B i with parameters b i .
Auxiliary random variables are made use of to aid with the execution of this protocol, drawing inspiration from the prescriptions of privacy amplification and information reconciliation in [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Each is a string of n-dimensional bits, viz.
. We shall denote random variables in Alice's subsystem by X i and in Bob's subsystem as Y i . Random variables X 1 and Y 1 are classically correlated with a probability distribution P (X 1 , Y 1 ), and are shared between Alice and Bob. Eavesdropping party, Eve, may have partial or complete information of the distribution P (X 1 , Y 1 ), which still allows for safe key distillation [16] . The string that will ultimately be used to determine the key, X 2 , is locally randomly generated in Alice's sealed labto guarantee Eve has no knowledge of it.
The following additional variables are defined:
in which ⊕ indicates bitwise binary addition, and where Y 2 will be defined at a later stage. Note: all 'addition' is modulo 2 for bits, but can be extended for higher dimensions as well.
B. The Assumptions
• What is referred to as a qubit is in actuality a qubit ensemble, for the determination of probabilities.
• Qubits, that is the qubit ensembles, are prepared in Alice's sealed laboratory.
• Observables A 1 , A 2 , B 1 , B 2 are selected such that maximal violation of the time-like Bell-CHSH inequality given by Eq. 3 can occur. This may be selected by Alice and Bob prior to the execution of the protocol.
• Qubit transmission happens over an error-free quantum channel.
C. The SIQKD Algorithm
The Quantum Component
A raw key is generated using the following method:
1. At time t 1 , Alice and Bob share classically correlated random variables X 1 and Y 1 with probability distribution P (X 1 , Y 1 ). Eve may have partial or complete information about this distribution, and may have provided Alice and Bob with these classical strings. 2. Alice has at her disposal n qubits, and at time t 2 , performs measurements on them according to the binary string U 1 . Example of such a scheme is the selection of observables: 0 -A 1 , 1 -A 2 .
3. The qubits are transmitted from Alice through the error-free quantum channel to Bob.
4. At time t 3 , Bob performs measurements on the first k qubits, which will later be used for a time-like Bell-CHSH check. He selects his observables B 1 and B 2 based on string Y 1 , in a manner similar to that of Alice selecting her observables.
5. At time t 4 , Bob publicly discloses his observables and probabilities for the first k qubits. Recall that rather than this referring to individual qubits, each is a qubit ensemble so that probabilities may be obtained.
6. Alice at t 5 , having complete knowledge of the k qubits measured at times t 2 and t 3 , determines whether the temporal Bell-CHSH inequality has been violated. If Eve had accessed the quantum channel between t 2 and t 3 then correlations between measurements performed at those times would have been disrupted, and the Bell-CHSH inequality would be satisfied. If no eavesdropper is detected, the remaining n − k qubits are used for key distillation.
7. Bob performs measurements in accordance with Y 1 on the remaining n − k qubits. Classical string
is the result Bob obtains. He calculates V 1 = Y 1 ⊕ Y 2 , where the first k bits in Y 1 are disregarded. In a similar manner, the rest of the protocol makes use of only the last n − k bits of each string. Thus, X 2 now denotes the last n − k of the original bit string X 2 .
The Classical Component
The key is distilled with the help of public discussion over a classical channel as follows:
• Step 1: Alice sends Bob the classical information about U 1 by operating with a parity check matrix, M . That is, she sends the string M U 1 , as this is more secure than Alice simply sending U 1 [20] . As a parity matrix, M follows, for a linear code
• Step 2: Bob determines W 1 = M U 1 ⊕ V 1 , and discloses it to Alice.
• Step 3: Alice determines U 2 = M X 1 ⊕ W 1 and discloses it to Bob.
• Step 4: Bob predicts X 2 through X 2 = U 2 ⊕ V 1 .
• Step 5: Alice and Bob then use a pre-determined hash function f to distill the key:
, where f is a function of f and M . This way, Bob need not have knowledge of M . Table I outlines the classical post-processing that occurs in each of the two subsystems. 
D. Toy Problem
To demonstrate SIQKD, a simple example is considered with n = 5, k = 2. Eve distributes X 1 and Y 1 to Alice and Bob. Assume the random variables share the trivial distribution in which bit sequence Y 1 = X 1 . The binary string X 2 is locally randomly generated in Alice's sealed lab as 10110, of which only the last three bits, 110, will ultimately be used for key distillation. For the purpose of this example, assume parity matrix M is the identity matrix. Assume the following measuring mechanism is implemented in their respective subsystems:
, which has been experimentally verified to violate the Bell-CHSH inequality using quantum optics in [10] . This is equivalent to the selection of basis |H , |V , |D , |A (see [21] for implementation using optics). 
Observable sequence for first k = 2 bits:
The ideal key length attainable is n − k = 3 bits, and the ideal key rate attainable is 3 5 .
E. Short Note: Key Rate and Hash Function
Note that the key rate portrayed is only an ideal. If E is the random variable that summarises Eve's information about X 2 , and P (E, X 2 ) is the joint distribution of the two, the length of the final distillable key r and hence, the key rate, depends on the hash function selected during the final distillation stage of the protocol and the constraints that P (E, X 2 ) must satisfy.
A hash function f is a function that can be used to map an arbitrarily sized string to a fixed size string. The function f : X 2 → {0, 1} r f is in general randomly selected from an appropriate class of maps, F , where r f is the length of the final key after application of the function. This selection is beyond the scope of the current text, but the construction of these functions, even within the quantum domain is an abiding interest in the cryptographic community [22] [23] [24] .
In the ideal scenario, r f = r. This final step in distillation provides a layer of security, so even if Eve knows partial information of the random string X 2 , and full information of F , she can still extract arbitrarily little information on the key K = f (X 2 ) [16, 25] .
IV. CONCLUSION
A secure state-independent quantum key distribution protocol is proposed, in which the test for eavesdropping is conducted through the time-like Bell-CHSH inequality in light of the BTCV formalism [1, 2] , irrespective of the qubit states. It is shown that this form manifests naturally from non-commutativity of observables. The SIQKD protocol includes a classical part for secure key distillation, which implements prominent features in current privacy amplification and information reconciliation techniques.
The SIQKD protocol provides a number of additional advantages over current key generation techniques apart from its novel state-independence. First, it requires less memory than those employing space-like entangled qubit pairs such as in [5] . It also retains qubits that would have otherwise been eliminated during checks of basis matching between Alice and Bob such as those in [3] . This protocol also eliminates a potential worst-case assumption in current QKD protocols: that Eve initially provides Alice and Bob the entangled qubit pairs.
